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WRITING TO LEARN LAW AND WRITING IN LAW: AN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ILLUSTRATION 
MICHAEL J. MADISON* 
INTRODUCTION 
I learned to read when I was a sophomore in high school.  Before then, I 
could follow the words and get the story, but I never really understood what 
literature meant, the way my English teachers wanted me to, until I wrote an 
essay in the tenth grade on The Great Gatsby.  It was a very short paper—only 
three or four pages, double-spaced—but the assignment transformed me.  Not 
just the writing itself, but the combination of the writing and my English 
teacher’s feedback.  I’d been writing analytic essays on literature for almost 
four years at that point.  For the first time a teacher responded by engaging me 
on the merits of my analysis—not just on the grammar, syntax, compositional 
form, and primitive analysis of a fifteen-year-old.  He took my thinking 
seriously!  That reaction made me rethink what I had done.  In my earlier 
attempts at literary analysis, I had been reading first, thinking second, and 
writing third.  With Gatsby, I was reading and thinking and writing 
simultaneously.  My thoughts were in the essay.  Both in process and product, 
writing was thinking and reading, and all of them were part of a larger system, 
reinforced and amplified by how my teacher responded.  Writing let me see 
inside the text.  Seeing inside and writing about what I saw were one and the 
same thing. 
By the time I became a law teacher, this anecdotal writing-to-learn lesson 
had long been submerged beneath the riptide of law’s ethos of pure cognition, 
the conceit that the purpose of law school and the highest calling of a 
practitioner is “thinking like a lawyer.”  Traditional legal education holds that a 
lawyer first learns to think, then exercises the mind via developing the skills of 
practice: oral advocacy, counseling, negotiation, drafting, and crafting written 
“work product.”  That conceptual duality has long been manifested in the 
duality of law faculties and the legal curriculum.  “Doctrinal” courses—
thinking courses—are taught by tenured and tenure-stream faculty who are 
thinkers themselves, that is, who are scholars.  “Skills” courses—legal research 
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and writing, and clinics—are taught by untenured faculty and others who are 
“do-ers,” trained to teach the “mere” skills of the profession.  I graduated from 
law school twenty years ago with that duality neatly inscribed on my 
professional consciousness. 
That duality persisted for a long time, through a career as a practicing 
lawyer and well into my career as a law teacher.  This isn’t the place to explore 
why that was so, nor is it the place for a sustained critique of the traditional law 
school curriculum and its traditional pedagogy.  But while I didn’t recognize 
the lesson at the time, my experience as a practitioner, like the experience of 
many practitioners, should have taught me something similar to what my tenth 
grade English teacher taught me years before. “Thinking like a lawyer” is a 
meaningless catch-phrase when it’s divorced from the materiality of actual 
practice.1 
“Thinking like a lawyer” only takes on life when thinking is coupled with 
“practicing like a lawyer”—or better, practicing and thinking as a lawyer: 
meeting and talking with clients and other lawyers, with judges and court and 
government personnel; investigating claims and defenses; structuring 
transactions; and writing and speaking as part and parcel of all of these things.  
I could have recognized the lesson.  For many years, my own favorite writers 
and teachers of writing have been authors who specialize in narrative 
nonfiction, a genre characterized by learning by writing, by exercising the 
skills of close observation and descriptive detail.  My bookshelf is an homage 
to John McPhee;2 I take my editorial cues from William Zinsser rather than 
Strunk and White.3  It was only as I invested in the literature of contemporary 
cognitive science and constructivist social theory—as part of my research and 
writing on intellectual property and technology law—that I began to see the 
light anew.  I could, and should, practice in my teaching what I was preaching 
in my scholarship.  To teach law, and specifically to teach students my 
specialty, intellectual property law, I now teach students to do as I do and as I 
 
 1. I’m not the first law professor to suggest that “thinking like a lawyer” fails to capture 
what legal education is or should be about.  For a slightly different take on the problem, see 
Nancy B. Rapoport, Is “Thinking Like a Lawyer” Really What We Want to Teach?, 1 J. ASS’N 
LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 91 (2002). 
 2. By acclamation among his peers and his fans, John McPhee is the dean of narrative 
nonfiction.  Over the last thirty-odd years, he has written more than thirty books and countless 
essays and articles on subjects ranging from orange production to Switzerland’s civil defense 
system to the basketball player Bill Bradley to the geology of the United States.  See JOHN 
MCPHEE, A SENSE OF WHERE YOU ARE: A PROFILE OF BILL BRADLEY AT PRINCETON (2d ed. 
1978); JOHN MCPHEE, ASSEMBLING CALIFORNIA (1993); JOHN MCPHEE, BASIN AND RANGE 
(1980); JOHN MCPHEE, LA PLACE DE LA CONCORDE SUISSE (1983); JOHN MCPHEE, ORANGES 
(1966). 
 3. Zinsser is known principally for ON WRITING WELL: AN INFORMAL GUIDE TO WRITING 
NONFICTION, originally published in 1976 and still in print.  My preferred Zinsser work is 
WRITING TO LEARN (1988). 
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did, rather than only to think as I would like them to think.  I teach them to 
learn by writing in intellectual property, and I teach them to be intellectual 
property lawyers. 
I.  FIRST, SOME THEORY 
I came to this practice largely via personal experience and anecdote, so it is 
gratifying and somewhat reassuring to realize that my instincts largely (if 
imperfectly) align with a number of different theories of learning and thinking.  
This isn’t a benign perfect storm of theory, but it’s close.  In this Part, I 
highlight some of the theoretical arguments that lie just beneath my practice, in 
order to provide a high-level roadmap for readers interested in access to more 
of the conceptual details. 
For close to forty years, the “writing across the curriculum” movement has 
urged greater pedagogical attention to the benefits of teaching students to 
write, teaching more students to write, and teaching students to write more.4  A 
big portion of that movement has been devoted to “writing to learn,” an 
approach with which Zinsser is associated, which suggests—consistent with 
my own experience—that both the process and product of writing can produce 
cognitive benefits.5 Writing-to-learn emphasizes student-centered 
compositional learning.  It emphasizes writing as the personal representation of 
knowledge.  A student can learn through writing, and in particular can learn his 
or her own mind and place, in addition to learning to write.  Exactly how 
writing-to-learn works is unclear.  That it should work and that it does work, in 
some contexts and particularly in legal education, seem largely beyond debate. 
A modest body of literature applies the writing-to-learn approach to legal 
education, principally in the Legal Research & Writing curriculum.  This 
literature recognizes that writing-to-learn may be more effective when the 
writing projects are oriented to problem-solving rather than to displays of 
knowledge.6  For legal educators, that distinction dovetails nicely with law 
 
 4. See, e.g., WILLIAM ZINSSER, WRITING TO LEARN 12–23 (1988). 
 5. The origins of “writing to learn” are usually traced to the work of Janet Emig and James 
Britton.  See JAMES N. BRITTON ET AL., THE DEVELOPMENT OF WRITING ABILITIES 11–18 
(1975); JAMES N. BRITTON, LANGUAGE AND LEARNING (2d ed. 1993) (arguing that language is 
central to learning, because it is through language that we organize our representation of the 
world); Janet Emig, Writing as a Mode of Learning, 28 COLLEGE COMPOSITION & COMM. 122, 
124 (1977) (arguing that writing is a uniquely effective form of learning, because it is at once 
enactive (learning by doing), iconic (based on acquisition and storage of images), and 
representational (restating images in words)). 
 6. Examples of legal educators developing the writing-as-thinking framework include 
Linda L. Berger, Applying the New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of Reader 
and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155 (1999), and J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. 
Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REV. 35 (1994).  Cf. Michael Hunter 
Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How Learning Theory and Instructional Design Can Inform 
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schools’ traditional implementations of the “thinking like a lawyer” 
pedagogical premise.  It is a short step from writing-as-a-form-of-thinking to 
teaching students to think via analyses of cases and problems, rather than via 
study of rules alone. 
Some scholars, including some legal scholars, distinguish writing-to-learn, 
which sometimes emphasizes an uncomfortably a-contextual, autonomous, 
freewheeling methodology, from writing-in-the-disciplines, which is highly 
sympathetic to writing as learning but which emphasizes the importance of 
discourse communities, rhetorical forms, institutions, practices, and feedback 
loops among writers, peers, and more experienced community members.7  
According to writing-in-the-disciplines, a student can learn by writing, but 
learning is especially likely if the student needs to learn the conventions and 
expectations of a particular discipline.  In writing-in-the-disciplines, writing is 
less a path of self-discovery and more a means of socialization into a 
community.8 
Fortunately for legal educators and especially for legal writing teachers, 
writing-in-the-disciplines dovetails nicely with emerging theories of the 
pedagogy of composition, which likewise stress rhetorical communities, 
discursive forms, and feedback loops between writers and readers.9  It also 
dovetails nicely with the more pragmatic and less theoretical expectations of 
law students and of the legal profession.  For decades, professional 
associations have urged law schools both to teach students to write (because, 
 
and Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347 (2001) (elaborating an instructional 
design methodology for legal education that is informed by learning theories). 
  While the available evidence does not confirm conclusively that writing is a means of 
learning, it does suggest that the theory works in the context of problem-solving, rather than 
“knowledge-telling.”  Laurel Currie Oates, Beyond Communication: Writing as a Means of 
Learning, 6 LEGAL WRITING 1 (2000).  The source of the “knowledge-telling” vs. “knowledge 
transforming” distinction in writing is CARL BEREITER & MARLENE SCARDAMALIA, THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF WRITTEN COMPOSITION 3–30 (1987). 
 7. Susan H. McLeod, Writing Across the Curriculum: The Second Stage, and Beyond, 40 
COLLEGE COMPOSITION & COMM. 337 (1989). 
 8. For a suggestive account of how writing-in-the-disciplines really consists of writing-to-
learn in the context of situated social practices, see Michael Carter, Miriam Ferli & Eric N. 
Wiebe, Writing to Learn by Learning to Write in the Disciplines, 21 J. BUS. & TECHNICAL 
COMMC’N 278 (2007).  Ackerman’s argument, that writing-to-learn is insufficiently attentive to 
nuances of institutional settings and practices, is consistent with shifting emphasis from writing-
to-learn to writing-in-the-disciplines.  See John M. Ackerman, The Promise of Writing to Learn, 
10 WRITTEN COMMC’N 334 (1993). 
 9. See, e.g., Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, and Entering the Discourse 
of Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489, 506–21 (2002); Philip C. Kissam, Lurching Towards the 
Millennium: The Law School, the Research University, and the Professional Reforms of Legal 
Education, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1965, 1988 (1999) (urging evaluation of law school writing 
according to principles of composition theory, that is, writing as a process, and writing as a social 
act); Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 6, at 56–61. 
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on the whole, students come to law school with poor writing skills) and to give 
students more instruction in legal writing and drafting.10 
Similar lessons about the virtues of writing practice emerge from theories 
of broader scope.  The core insight of writing-in-the-disciplines, that practice 
in the skills of a discipline can produce disciplinary knowledge when that 
practice is guided by feedback from experienced members of the discipline, is 
consistent with both cognitivist and constructivist theories of learning.11  
Constructivist theories emphasize that learners construct knowledge on their 
own, via interaction with other learners, in complex environments, building 
from present understanding to new understanding.12  Learning is not 
principally a matter of absorbing and understanding pre-existing forms.13  
Cognitivist theories emphasize that learning occurs in the mind itself.14  
Learned behaviors and uses of language cannot be understood (or taught) 
without an appreciation or attention to mental processes.  Both perspectives 
emphasize mental constructs that are always present in the mind and ready to 
be activated.  Both emphasize the transferability of knowledge, that is, can the 
learner transfer what is learned in one context to a new but related context?15  
Both emphasize connections between material practice and knowledge 
structures. 
I’m not an educational theorist, so I have little need to specify precisely 
how cognitivist or constructivist processes work or to explain in detail how 
 
 10. See Robert MacCrate et al., Legal Education and Professional Development—An 
Educational Continuum: Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: 
Narrowing the Gap, 1992 A.B.A SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR.  This is 
universally known as the “MacCrate Report,” after the chair of the Task Force that produced it, 
Robert MacCrate. 
 11. See Pamela Lysaght & Cristina D. Lockwood, Writing-Across-the-Law-School 
Curriculum: Theoretical Justifications, Curricular Implications, 2 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING 
DIRECTORS 73 (2004) (arguing that the “writing-in-the-disciplines” thread of the writing across 
the curriculum movement should dominate the legal education curriculum, rather than the 
“writing to learn” thread, as most consistent with themes common to behaviorist, cognitivist, and 
constructivist learning theories); Carol M. Parker, A Liberal Education in Law: Engaging the 
Legal Imagination Through Research and Writing Beyond the Curriculum, 1 J. ASS’N LEGAL 
WRITING DIRECTORS 130, 136–40 (2002) (describing elements of constructivist learning theory 
as they relate to compositional learning in law schools). 
  Some argue that writing-in-the-disciplines is equally consistent with behaviorist learning 
theories, too.  See Lysaght & Lockwood, supra, at 103.  As I explain in the text, for reasons 
having to do with my own scholarly interests, I emphasize cognitivist and constructivist 
approaches. 
 12. See Lysaght & Lockwood, supra note 11, at 90–92. 
 13. Id. at 90. 
 14. See id. at 83–84. 
 15. Learning theorists refer to the process as “transfer.”  See Peggy A. Ertmer & Timothy J. 
Newby, Behaviorism, Cognitivism, Constructivism: Comparing Critical Features from an 
Instructional Design Perspective, 6 PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT Q. 50, 55–56 (1993). 
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writing-in-the-disciplines connects with either of them.  My own experience as 
a lawyer supplies solid if anecdotal evidence that the connection is there, both 
as I learned by writing myself and as I observed junior lawyers learning by 
writing under my supervision.16  As I describe in the next Part, my experience 
as a teacher has been that my students learn this way as well. 
Before turning to a description of my teaching practice, I want to connect 
my pedagogy to my research.  When I noted above that I came to my approach 
via personal experience and anecdote, I meant not only that I gradually learned 
that my teaching style should be informed by my experience as a writer and as 
a practitioner, but also that my teaching could be informed by my scholarship.  
My interest in cognition and constructivism in the classroom was stimulated by 
my appreciation of their roles in the law and theory of intellectual property 
law.  I have written at length about how theories of conceptual metaphor (the 
idea that linguistic structures, and metaphor in particular, reflect mental 
constructs)17 and embodied cognition (the idea that cognitive processes are 
“embodied” in material behaviors and practices)18 can inform intellectual 
property law.19  I have argued that conceptual metaphor coupled with the 
concept of situated social practices (the notion that individual cognition, 
including learning, finds expression in social contexts sometimes referred to as 
 
 16. I practiced law in private law firms for nine years before entering the academy. 
 17. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980); GEORGE 
LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE 
MIND (1987).  For related research on cognitive linguistics, see, for example, RAYMOND W. 
GIBBS, JR., THE POETICS OF MIND: FIGURATIVE THOUGHT, LANGUAGE, AND UNDERSTANDING 
(1994); Eleanor Rosch & Carolyn B. Mervis, Family Resemblances: Studies in the Internal 
Structure of Categories, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 573 (1975).  Within legal discourse, Carol 
Parker draws more explicit connections among compositional theories of writing, constructivist 
learning theory, and Lakoff’s ideas on “embodied cognition.”  See Parker, supra note 11. 
 18. See, e.g., EDWIN HUTCHINS, COGNITION IN THE WILD 353–74 (1995).  Cognitive 
science is subject to the critique that it undervalues individual intentionality in its account of 
human behavior.  Mark Johnson argues that intentionality is itself contextual: 
. . . [A]ny statements we make, any directives we give, any rules we lay down are 
applicable, not because the concepts specify their own determinate conditions of 
satisfaction, but rather because we understand these concepts and rules relative to shared 
idealized cognitive models, scripts, and narratives that are tied to embodied experiences, 
communal histories, practices, and values.  The rules can work, when they work, precisely 
because of these framing cognitive models and practices.  They are not . . . merely non-
propositional, non-semantic background assumptions.  Rather, they are part of our 
conceptual apparatus by which we make sense of and act purposively within concrete 
situations. 
Mark Johnson, Law Incarnate, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 949, 957 (2002). 
 19. Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1525 (2004); Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 
56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381 (2005); George H. Taylor & Michael J. Madison, Metaphor, 
Objects, and Commodities, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 141 (2006). 
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“communities of practice”)20 helps illuminate the problem of understanding 
creativity within the context of copyright law.21  I have noted the constructivist 
roots of our thinking about the intersection between property and technology.22  
Both cognitive theory and constructivism are close cousins of narrative theory, 
and I have borrowed the narratival insights of Law and Literature23 in studying 
the law and policy of the Internet.24 
In sum, in my scholarly writing I have argued that creativity is a social 
practice that is material and is closely bound up with uses of language.  
Designing copyright and patent law structures with that premise in mind is an 
important strategy if society wants to promote the production of creative and 
innovative things.  To my modest surprise, I have discovered that “being a 
 
 20. See HUTCHINS, supra note 18; JEAN LAVE, COGNITION IN PRACTICE: MIND, 
MATHEMATICS AND CULTURE IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1988); JEAN LAVE & ETIENNE WENGER, 
SITUATED LEARNING: LEGITIMATE PERIPHERAL PARTICIPATION 98 (1991) (defining “community 
of practice [a]s a set of relations among persons, activity, and world, over time and in relation 
with other tangential and overlapping communities of practice”); John Seely Brown, Allan 
Collins & Paul Duguid, Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning, 18 EDUC. RESEARCHER 
32 (1989); Michael J. Madison, Social Software, Groups, and Governance, 2006 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 153 (2006). 
 21. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach, supra note 19; Michael J. Madison, Rewriting 
Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391 (2005); 
Michael J. Madison, Fair Use and Social Practices, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
INFORMATION WEALTH 177 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007). 
 22. Madison, Law as Design, supra note 19. 
 23. James Boyd White premised the canonical The Legal Imagination on the following 
question: “What does it mean to learn to think and speak like a lawyer?”  JAMES BOYD WHITE, 
THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION, xix 
(1973).  He answered that question by asking the law student to “write as a lawyer, judge, and 
legislator, and to reflect as a mind and a person on what he has done, to speak in his own voice 
about his experience of writing and thinking.”  Id.  Note the shift from “think like a lawyer” to 
“write as a lawyer.”  This is both cognitive and constructivist. 
The effort of the book is not to reach conclusions, even tentative ones, but to define 
responsibilites.  The hope is not that a systematic view of life will be exposed, but that the 
student will come to some new awareness of his place in the world, of his powers and 
obligations.  In every paper he defines himself as a mind, and you might say that this act 
of self-expression is our real subject.  Not a legal writing course, then, but a course in 
writing.   
Id. at xxi.; see also Thomas D. Eisele, The Activity of Being a Lawyer: The Imaginative Pursuit of 
Implications and Possibilities, 54 TENN L. REV. 345, 345–54 (1987) (building on Michael 
Oakeshott, The Activity of Being an Historian, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 
137 (1962)); James Boyd White, Teaching Law and Literature, in FROM EXPECTATION TO 
EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS ON LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION 73, 77 (1999) (describing “the activity of 
being a lawyer” as inextricably intertwined with struggles with the constraints and enablements of 
language). 
 24. Michael J. Madison, The Narratives of Cyberspace Law (or, Learning from Casablanca), 
27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 249 (2004). 
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lawyer” and “thinking like (or as) a lawyer” are themselves social practices 
that are material and are closely bound up with uses of language.25 
Little of this was in the front of my mind when I first set about to revise 
my courses, which were based on traditional law school exams, but as I noted 
in the Introduction, my research and scholarship prompted me to think about 
the variety of ways in which I could put social and cultural theory to use.  It’s 
nice to know now that much of what I practice can be justified theoretically.  
Even if little of that theoretical justification relates specifically to intellectual 
property (IP) or technology law, the subjects that I teach, it seems appropriate 
to me that I use IP to situate scholarly insights about cognitive science and 
constructivist theory next to their counterparts in teaching and learning.26 
II.  WRITING IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
This Part describes the nuts and bolts of my method.  Rather than try to 
link each element of my practice to the theories described briefly in the last 
Part, I simply explain what I do.  I leave it to the interested reader to draw 
theoretical inferences beyond this simple writing-in-the-disciplines premise: 
Teaching IP students to write as IP lawyers, by giving them sustained, 
problem-based, collaborative, realistic, and feedback-driven exposure to what 
IP lawyers (and all lawyers) actually do with the written word, is an effective 
way to teach them IP law.  What I want my students to know is the conceptual 
vocabulary and syntax of the law.  I help them to acquire those conceptual 
elements by situating them in students’ own compositional vocabulary and 
syntax, and to the maximum extent possible, in a real law practice setting. 
A. Creating and Distributing the Assignments 
Teaching law through writing requires making some choices.  There are 
lots of kinds and forms of legal writing.  I choose to focus on one form 
throughout a course, rather than putting students through the paces associated 
with several different forms.  In my upper-level intellectual property and 
technology courses, each student’s grade is based on performance on three 
 
 25. I am hardly the first person to discover this, nor the first to put it into practice.  See Jules 
L. Coleman, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL 
THEORY 77 (2001) (conceiving of legal systems as social practices based on the structure and 
content of their core concepts, viewed from the point of view of participants in those practices).  
For examples of writing-to-learn applied in particular law school settings, see Elizabeth Fajans & 
Mary R. Falk, Comments Worth Making: Supervising Scholarly Writing in Law School, 46 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 342 (1996); Kissam, supra note 9, at 2012–13; Parker, supra note 11, at 141–42. 
 26. This meta-discussion of cognition and constructivism is itself consistent with a writing-
in-the-disciplines path to knowledge.  Until I began writing this Essay, I hadn’t focused 
specifically on this parallel in my work. 
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research memos produced over the course of the semester.27  I have used this 
method in courses on copyright law, trademark law, cyberspace law, and the 
law of electronic commerce, so in specific context the details have varied 
slightly.28  The basic mechanics, however, are set out below. 
A single memo assignment is distributed to the entire class approximately 
five weeks into the semester.  A second assignment goes out approximately ten 
weeks into the semester.  A third and final assignment is distributed at the 
conclusion of the semester.  In some courses, I specify the anticipated due 
dates of each assignment as part of the initial syllabus.  In others, I omit the 
due dates from the syllabus and schedule the assignments on an ad hoc basis.29  
Each assignment specifies a memo to be turned in approximately ten days 
later.  The assignments are distributed electronically, both by being posted on 
the course website30 and by being distributed via course e-mail list. 
Each assignment contains both a hypothetical fact pattern to be addressed 
and a set of instructions that is common to all of the assignments.  The 
common instructions are as follows.  The memo specified by each assignment 
is a “standard” legal research memo, that is, it is to comply with the default 
rules on format, organization, and style that students learned (or should have 
learned) during their legal research and writing training in their first year.  In 
other words, the work product is the standard work product of a junior 
practitioner, with a Statement of Facts, Issue Presented, Short Answer, and full 
Analysis of the problem.  The length of the memo is specified.  Typically, I 
permit only very short memos.  My default limit is four pages of text, typed or 
 
 27. In my law practice, I was a litigator, at least most of the time.  I rely on research memos 
in part because I wrote a lot of memos and a lot of briefs as a practitioner, and in part because 
other kinds of legal writing with which I’m familiar—litigation documents; letters to clients, 
courts, and opposing counsel; and licenses—are form-based to a significant degree.  In my 
opinion, teaching law via that kind of writing either is less likely to lead to the problem-solving 
kind of writing-to-learn experience that the literature recommends, or requires an investment of 
teaching resources that significantly exceeds what I have available as a teacher working solo in 
my classroom. 
 28. Before joining the faculty at the University of Pittsburgh, I taught at Harvard Law 
School as what is now known as a Climenko Fellow.  I team-taught a course on lawyering skills 
that blended instruction in substantive law with exposure to “real” legal skills, including memo 
writing, drafting transactional documents, and interviewing and client counseling. 
 29. I have found that students don’t complain much about the absence of notice in the 
syllabus, because each assignment allows ten days or so for completion.  At times I specify the 
dates in advance, however, because doing so helps me plan my own schedule more effectively. 
 30. I typically post each assignment in both HTML and PDF formats.  I sometimes include 
hyperlinks to websites with relevant information, such as images, video, or audio of relevant 
products.  In one instance I based a copyright problem on a series of stuffed tigers, and I uploaded 
and made available images of the tigers that I produced myself. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
832 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:823 
printed, and double-spaced.31  Students are instructed to adopt the role of a 
junior lawyer or, in certain cases, a law clerk to a judge, and they are asked to 
address their work to their supervisor—me, either as a senior lawyer or as a 
judge.32  In class (more on this below), I tell the students that their work 
product may be shared not only with the assigning attorney (or judge), but also 
with a client, and that the client even more than the assigning attorney is 
concerned with professionalism in form as well as substance.  I tell them that 
the strict length limitation is largely a product of client interests. 
The instructions specify that all of the assignments are “open” projects.  I 
advise them orally that the hypothetical can be fairly and fully analyzed using 
the materials assigned for the course.  (I teach from a typical casebook.)  I also 
advise them that they are free to consult any source whatsoever in the course of 
their work, so long as they comply with applicable ethical rules and cite 
sources as required by rule and/or practice.33  Beyond that guideline, as part of 
the initial assignment of the semester, I give them relatively little information 
regarding how or what to do to prepare the memo.  In the context of that first 
assignment of the semester, initially I do not volunteer the proposition that they 
may consult with each other.  My expectation is that by omitting a reference to 
collaboration will prompt students eventually to figure out that collaboration is 
permitted.  Before that first memo is turned in, I confirm the proposition by 
asking the students to note on their memos the names of any students that they 
talked with about the assignment.  (I don’t take this information into account 
when grading the papers.  I’m interested in emergent patterns of collaboration.) 
The substance of the assignments typically emerges from recently filed or, 
less frequently, recently decided cases.  Intellectual property law lends itself to 
this approach simply because of the wealth of litigation, the variety of novel 
and entertaining claims put into play, and the fact that coverage of these cases 
is usually quick and robust via weblogs.  Finding raw material for new 
assignments has not been a problem.  I adapt what I find, modifying the facts 
for my purposes by simplifying them and condensing them.  Because I rely 
mostly on found material, it is rare that I distribute an assignment that is 
carefully crafted to capture specific issues—and only those issues.  There is, in 
 
 31. The “to,” “from,” “date,” and “subject” header may be single-spaced.  I also specify 
margins (one inch all around); I forbid footnotes; and I specify the font (twelve-point Times New 
Roman, or its equivalent). 
 32. In other words, sometimes the memos are designed as “objective” memos that call for 
impartial analysis of law, fact, and policy; more frequently, they are designed as “subjective” 
memos that call for analysis from the point of view of a particular client.  I have occasionally 
asked students to serve as staff to a legislative committee and write memos, addressed to a staff 
director, that analyze proposed legislation. 
 33. I do not require strict adherence to Bluebook formats for citations, but I do tell the 
students that I expect that any citation standard they adopt should be clear to the reader and 
applied consistently throughout their work. 
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other words, a certain crudeness in each assignment. Factual conflicts and 
inconsistencies remain.  There are conflicts or even outright gaps in the 
applicable law.  The crudeness is intentional.  Real cases in law practice rarely 
come into the office with labels that limit analysis to specific issues chosen by 
the lawyers.  The content of the assignment, like the form of the assignment, 
the process by which it is to be completed, and the work product itself, mirrors 
the experience of a junior lawyer faced with a problem that may not have a 
solution.  I want students to see the ambiguities and uncertainties that real 
world circumstances often entail. 
The second and third assignments of the semester are identical in form to 
the first one, though of course the hypotheticals change, and the complexity of 
the analysis increases somewhat as students are exposed to and are expected to 
be conversant with more underlying material.  Students have had the 
opportunity to internalize lessons from collaboration, so while students don’t 
necessarily collaborate in practice, they are nominally aware that collaboration 
is permitted.  I might increase the length limits for the memos to account for 
the increased complexity of the analysis expected, but usually I don’t. 
I ask the students to turn in hard copies of their work by hand (not by e-
mail), to me in person or to my secretary or the Registrar.34  The due date and 
time for each memo does not correspond to a class meeting time, to prevent 
conflicts between class attendance and students’ finishing and delivering 
memos.  I tell the students that I do not grant extensions under any 
circumstances short of catastrophic illness, injury, or family emergency, and 
even then only with the participation of the Associate Dean. 
B. Managing the Assignments 
In their written form, the hypotheticals and the accompanying assignments 
are somewhat cryptic, or at least more cryptic than students prefer.  The first 
time that I gave a memo assignment, students asked me so many questions 
outside of the classroom that I quickly decided to dedicate class time to 
answering all questions at once.  Doing so has the added benefit of ensuring 
that all students have access to identical supplemental information about each 
assignment.  Since then, a class briefing has been a standard part of each 
exercise. 
When each assignment is distributed, I tell the students that class time on a 
designated day will be dedicated to answering any and all questions about the 
assignment.  I also tell them that my policy is not to answer questions about the 
assignment except as part of the class briefing.  I don’t answer one-on-one 
questions in my office or in the hallway; I don’t answer questions via e-mail.  
 
 34. The “no e-mail” restriction is at odds with the realities of contemporary practice.  I use 
the rule to enforce a level of formality and professional discipline that might otherwise erode. 
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The class session is scheduled to take place some days after the assignment is 
distributed, so that students have enough time to digest the problem, do 
preliminary research or writing, and come up with questions or concerns.  I 
promise to take a full hour of class time, if necessary, to answer questions.35 
I spend part of the class briefing occupying the role that I have assigned 
myself as part of the writing exercise: senior lawyer, judge, supervising 
attorney, or even client.  I try to answer in character.  As a rule, I don’t 
withhold information from the written assignment in order to see if students 
can elicit it, but on occasion students will see factual ambiguities in the 
assignment that require that the “interview” supplement the facts.  Sometimes I 
choose to supplement.  Sometimes I choose not to.  Both because they see the 
process unfold, and because I confirm it for them explicitly, students learn that 
in practice, senior lawyers sometimes assign work to junior lawyers without 
specifying the scope of the assignment.  Junior lawyers need to learn how to 
elicit clarification.  Students also learn that lawyers sometimes have to give 
advice without knowing all of the facts. 
I also spend part of the class briefing session occupying my usual role as a 
teacher, answering questions about the plausible scope of research that the 
assignment might entail, confirming that research is permitted but not required, 
and answering questions about the legal issues involved (and not involved) in 
the assignment.  Typically in the first of these class briefings I confirm (if 
asked) that collaborating with fellow students is permitted but not required, 
and I confirm that students are expected to disclose the names of their student 
collaborators. 
C. Grading and Evaluation 
Feedback is a critical part of the memo writing approach, so grading the 
memos takes a very long time.  Depending on the number of students in the 
course,36 I may take up to two weeks to grade and return the memos, though I 
am careful to return graded memos before distributing the next assignment. 
In grading the memos, I evaluate both compositional elements and 
substantive elements.  Grammar, syntax, organization, and presentation are 
important, as is the quality of legal and factual analysis.  I often critique each 
memo line-by-line, so that the students receive graded memos that are 
shrouded in the proverbial sea of red ink.  For many memos, I also include a 
summary critique at the end of the memo.  My preference as a lawyer and now 
as a teacher is to pull no punches.  Poor and mediocre memos are treated 
harshly.  Good memos are praised as such.  In the main, students seem to be 
 
 35. In practice, student questions and my answers have never occupied a full hour of class. 
 36. I have used this teaching method with classes of as many as eighty-five students and 
with as few at thirty-five students.  For the time being, I now cap enrollment at fifty students per 
class in order to keep my grading burden at a manageable level. 
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taken aback by the bluntness of the assessments, at least at first, but they also 
seem to appreciate their value.  As much as possible, in my critiques, I try to 
engage their arguments on their own terms.  I take their reasoning seriously. 
For each assignment, I assess each memo on a one to ten point scale.  A 
truly excellent memo is scored a ten; a mediocre memo receives a seven; a 
poor memo receives a five or four or even (in the extraordinary case) a three.37  
(Even a poor memo typically identifies the parties correctly and wanders, if a 
bit aimlessly, in the forest of the correct legal domain.)  At the end of the 
semester, I multiply the numerical scores by the weights assigned to each 
assignment (usually thirty percent for the first and second memos, and forty 
percent  for the third), and assign letter grades according to a curve imposed on 
the results.  By design, straight A grades are extremely difficult to come by.  In 
practice, a student usually has to write at least two ten-point memos, combined 
with a nine-point memo, in order to receive a straight A. 
I use a ten-point scoring scale for the memos, rather than letter grades, 
partly because I want to limit strategic behavior by students who are too certain 
of their likely final grade too early in the semester, and partly because I’m not 
confident of my ability to differentiate the quality of the work at a finer scale.  
Students who receive a score of ten know that they have done well, but they 
don’t know how well.  Students who receive a score of five know that they 
have done poorly, but they don’t know how poorly.  I want to keep as many 
students as possible invested in working hard on all three memos.  And I want 
to conserve my own ability to refine my sense of the relative quality of the 
work over the course of the semester.  After each round of memos is returned 
to the students, I have several conversations with students in my office, 
explaining that a five doesn’t mean the end of their shot at a B in the course, let 
alone the end of their legal career.  An early ten does not assure an A. 
None of the grading is anonymous.  I tell students at the outset that their 
real names should be used on their memos.  I tell them that I use a non-
anonymous grading system to be consistent with my premise that I am 
mimicking how work is assigned and critiqued in the real world of law 
practice.  Junior associates are not anonymous.  I have never had a student 
question the practice. 
I return the graded memos to students at the end of a class session, 
distributing the papers according to the class roster organized alphabetically.38 
 
 37. The score is a composite of my assessment of writing and substantive analysis.  As a 
rule, I do not score each separately before assigning an overall score. 
 38. Usually I begin with the letter A, but I occasionally begin at the end of the alphabet.  
Doing so turns out to be a cheap and easy way to validate long-suffering students with last names 
that begin with Z or Y. 
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D. Feedback and Followup 
Just before returning the memos, I typically spend part of that class 
commenting on major themes in the memos and the grading.  If time permits 
and circumstances warrant (for example, if a lot of students devoted a lot of 
their memos to wild goose chases), I may prepare and distribute a written 
summary of my overall analysis of both the hypothetical and of issues common 
to the students’ memos. 
After the graded memos are returned, I typically ask the authors of three or 
four of the best memos for permission to post their work as models on the 
course website.39  Like the classroom briefing sessions, I implemented this 
aspect of the method in response to student suggestions.  Students not only 
value the specific feedback that I provide on their memos but also value 
comparing their work to that of the most successful students.  I have never had 
an author refuse my request; in fact, most seem to consider it an honor.  Before 
posting, I remove the authors’ names from their memos.40 
As I noted above, I talk to individual students in my office at length 
regarding questions about their memos and my commentary.  Often these are 
students who fared poorly on a given assignment.  I also talk to a considerable 
number of more successful students who want to confirm precisely what they 
did well. 
III.  THE META OF METHOD 
Does it work?  Am I following a teaching method that produces better 
intellectual property lawyers, better legal thinkers, and better writers?  Is this 
an example of appropriate and successful writing-in-the-disciplines?  I think 
and hope so, but it’s really too soon to tell, and I’m not sure that I know where 
to begin determining the answers.  In this Part, I offer preliminary thoughts on 
some of the strengths and weaknesses of the method as I’ve experienced them. 
A. Too Many Notes? 
Designing, administering, and grading memos during the semester adds a 
significant amount of complexity to the ordinary burdens of teaching a 
course—designing and managing a syllabus, preparing for class each day, and 
(perhaps) preparing audio-visual presentations and examples.  The added 
burden is offset only partly by relief from the duty of grading final exams. 
 
 39. I do this privately, of course. 
 40. I ask the students to send me text-based electronic versions of their work.  For each 
memo, I delete the student’s name from the body of the document.  I also delete identifying 
information from the meta-data fields of the document.  Then I convert the file to PDF format and 
post that version on the course website. 
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In the best of worlds, moreover, classroom teaching style should be 
modified to prepare students for their responsibilities in writing the memos.  I 
begin my classroom adaptation early in the semester, by laying out for the 
students many of my pragmatic justifications for using the memo method, so 
that those who wish to opt out have an opportunity to do so.  I also try to adapt 
class by class, by emphasizing that the problem-solving types of class 
discussions that I encourage are related to the exercises that they will 
encounter in the memos. 
My approach puts a lot of balls into the air at once.  Managing it is clearly 
a somewhat risky juggling act, especially since I don’t rely on teaching 
assistants or research assistants for any of the work.  I am preaching not only 
mastery of a substantive legal discipline but also mastery of the art of legal 
writing, and I am wrapping the whole package in a sermon on professionalism 
and discipline.  Throughout, I have to draw a series of balances between 
making various forms of knowledge explicit, on the one hand, and leaving 
some forms of knowledge tacit or implicit, on the other hand, so that the 
students have an opportunity to learn by developing that knowledge 
themselves, via practice. 
To be worth the investment, high risks must bring high rewards, and I 
believe that they do.  Mozart was famously (and fictitiously) accused of using 
“too many notes,”41 but he was Mozart.  The joke was on Emperor Joseph II.  
I’m no Mozart, and there is no joke to play on the students, but over the course 
of a semester, the overall quality of the students’ work improves.  I don’t have 
to wait for final exams to learn whether my students have learned anything.  I 
can monitor their progress during the semester and adjust and address issues 
accordingly.  Anecdotally, I see and hear from students who are actively and 
energetically engaged with the substance of the legal analysis because they 
want to get it right, not because they want to earn a grade.  In the somewhat 
odd world of legal education, few things are more satisfying to a law teacher 
than to watch students debate the finest details of statutory construction 
passionately, among themselves.  Given the opportunity, a large number of 
students who take one of my memo-based courses come back for more of the 
same.  And practitioners in the local bar consistently tell me that they 
appreciate my approach to legal education over the conventional exam-based 
method.  It may not be a symphony, but the players are humming a nice tune. 
B. Risks and Limitations: Student Background, Pedagogical Consistency, 
and Ethics 
The method has drawbacks that I can do little about.  I can’t teach writing 
and thinking to students who don’t know how to write and think to begin with.  
 
 41. AMADEUS (Warner Bros. 1984). 
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Some students come into my classes with very good basic writing and thinking 
skills.  Some come to my classes with very poor writing and thinking skills.  
Some come to the class having already internalized a strong set of professional 
values; their work is more careful and polished from the beginning.  Poor 
writers and the less disciplined students are at an obvious disadvantage from a 
competitive standpoint, although there is no reason that they can’t learn as 
much as their colleagues during the course.  A similar comparative advantage 
accrues to students with prior legal or professional work experience, whether 
in part-time jobs, summer internships, or pre-legal careers. 
Students who are non-native English speakers, and students with learning 
styles not suited to written work, may be challenged to perform well in this 
environment.  LL.M. and other graduate law students who have not 
experienced the basic American legal research and writing curriculum may 
need supplemental instruction in the mechanics of this form of legal writing.42  
Before I accept an LL.M. or other non-J.D. student into my course, I brief the 
student (or, in the case of LL.M. students, the administrators of the LL.M. 
program) on the character of the assessment method and my expectations.  
Students with different learning styles need to adapt to my teaching style just 
as they will need to adapt to the demands of clients and their supervisors in law 
practice.  One can opt out of my courses, just as one can choose a professional 
career that does not require a lot of writing. 
Plagiarism is a constant concern.  I eliminate one source of potential 
problems by never re-using an old assignment.  I eliminate a second source by 
sanctioning student collaboration and by permitting outside research, and a 
third source by trying when possible to draw hypotheticals from pending cases.  
What remains is the possibility that a student might locate published analysis 
of the pending case, or analysis of a similar hypothetical, and re-use it in the 
memo.43  I can’t discount entirely the possibility that this goes on, though I try 
to be familiar with ongoing public analysis, if it exists, and more importantly, I 
use my own nose for writing that likely was produced by a practicing 
professional, rather than by a law student.  Between Westlaw, LexisNexis, and 
Internet search engines, checking papers for problems is usually pretty 
simple.44 
It is possible that the time demands that my assignments impose on 
students create conflicts with the expectations of other faculty teaching the 
 
 42. Students with a first law degree from a civil law country may also have difficulty with 
the precedent-driven style of legal analysis expected in the American legal system. 
 43. It is also conceivable that one student will simply copy a colleague’s work.  With a 
sufficiently small class, detection is so easy that the probability of this occurring seems extremely 
remote. 
 44. Through well over 1,000 memos, I have identified one case of unambiguous plagiarism.  
A student copied material from a law firm’s website. 
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same students.  On average, I find that each student spends roughly fifteen 
hours producing the first memo and roughly twenty to twenty-five hours 
producing each of the subsequent memos.  Student attention and time are 
rivalrous resources.  Am I monopolizing the students?  To the extent that my 
colleagues are aware of how I teach (and the Dean of the law school certainly 
is aware), I have heard nothing but praise.  Our faculty has a strong 
commitment to innovation in teaching and specifically to incorporating writing 
into upper-level courses. 
All of my J.D. students have at least spent a year in law school in the basic 
legal research and writing curriculum.  I rely on that experience, of course, 
when I assume that all of my students can organize and compose a basic legal 
research memo.  I have learned, however, that students tend to assume that the 
model of a legal research memo that they learned from a particular instructor is 
the only true model of a legal research memo.  My own training and experience 
may be slightly different, so when I grade memos according to my own 
expectations rather than according to this only true model of a legal research 
memo, students complain.  In my courses, as in beginning legal research and 
writing classes, students sometimes err by devoting too much time and space to 
recitation of legal principles, and insufficient time and space to identifying and 
analyzing the relevant facts.  I solve this complication in a number of ways.  
First, of course, I confer with the legal research and writing faculty, who tell 
me that they do not teach anything approaching the only true model, and that 
my expectation is consistent with their teaching.  Second, I advise the students 
that as practicing lawyers, they should anticipate that different supervisors may 
expect work product in a variety of forms.  Part of determining the scope of an 
assignment is identifying the correct form of the output, and a quick 
conversation with the source (or a quick question during a class briefing) can 
resolve any ambiguity.  Third, I describe in class how my expectation and the 
only true model differ, which is in very modest details.   
C. Breadth and Depth, and the Payoff 
Teaching substantive law by teaching writing as I do involves one tradeoff 
above all others.  Because of the in-class time dedicated to discussing the 
hypotheticals and the graded memos, I sacrifice four to six hours of class time 
over the course of the semester that otherwise would be devoted to coverage of 
additional substantive topics.  My experience with copyright law has been that 
I lose coverage of substantive law that I think that students otherwise would 
enjoy and find useful.  My experience with trademark law and cyberspace law 
has been that the loss of substantive coverage is less significant.  Each 
teacher’s experience will be different. 
The cost in coverage is more than offset by the major pedagogical benefit 
that the memos offer.  I can monitor the progress of each student and of the 
class in general.  On the whole, the first round of memos is typically mediocre.  
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Students aren’t as deeply engaged with the contents of the law as they should 
be.  They don’t appreciate the importance of the facts.  They don’t take their 
professional obligations seriously.  Memos aren’t proofread.  One or two 
students will exceed the page limit or otherwise fail to follow instructions.  
Miscues, both minor and major, are noted in my comments and linked to the 
scoring.  They are repeated in the second memo, but much less frequently and 
dramatically.  The third and final round of memos shows clear improvement 
overall.  Not every student improves, and some students may fall back a bit.  
But as a group, by the end of the semester the students express a professional 
sensibility about the law that is quite tangible, welcome, and distinct from the 
flat reflection of learning that emerges from the typical stack of exam books.  
Students are still expected to learn to think like or as a lawyer—an intellectual 
property lawyer.  But to a far greater degree than before, I can confirm that this 
is actually happening.45 
CONCLUSION 
Years ago, a prospective law student appeared in my office, anxious about 
the wisdom of his choice to attend law school.  He had been an English major 
in college, but his true calling to that point was the visual arts.  He showed me 
a portfolio of his work.  The question he asked was whether someone with a 
truly artistic sensibility had a future in a discipline apparently dedicated to 
logic and order.  I told him that law and law practice were much like art and 
artistic practice.  Just as an artist finds aesthetic order in the world that he 
perceives and expresses that order in a given medium, understanding law and 
becoming a lawyer requires appreciating the received materials of the legal 
system and compiling those materials conceptually into a synthesis that 
appeals to the mind—much as a completed work of art appeals to the eye, the 
ear, the touch, or even the nose. 
The student decided to enroll in our law school, and he took my courses.  
He was (and remains) very smart, and he worked very hard, and he was a 
senior editor of the law review and was elected to the Order of the Coif at 
graduation.  After the graduation ceremony, he approached me and reminded 
 
 45. This Essay hasn’t focused on how my practice responds to a distinct but related 
deficiency in traditional legal education, which one author describes as excessive reliance on a 
“Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model.”  See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 349–58.  There is 
self-teaching at work in my method, too, but it is self-teaching that is monitored more closely 
than usual and guided by more feedback than is common. 
  My efforts to promote self-initiated collaboration among students tend to be 
unsuccessful.  According to the self-reports of collaborative activity that I request, there is a 
modest uptick in collaboration over the course of the semester.  I suspect that law students either 
don’t know how to work collaboratively or expect that they won’t need to know in law practice.  
For now, teaching in a way that addresses this problem would add one task too many to my 
agenda. 
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me of our conversation more than three years before.  He said that I had been 
exactly right and that my insight was precisely what enabled him not just to 
survive in law school, but to thrive.  Today, he is a successful intellectual 
property lawyer in a major American city. 
As teachers, we collect anecdotes from appreciative students.  I 
particularly like this one because it illustrates my basic point so clearly (even if 
it doesn’t have writing at its core).  Teachers need to give students the right 
tools and to show students those tools to enable them to become the 
professionals that the students want to be.  Much of the time, and more often 
than most law faculty may realize, doing that involves drawing explicit 
connections between the knowledge that we want to teach and the practice that 
the students want to learn.  In many respects, knowledge and practice are one 
and the same.  Law professors who teach legal research and writing, and 
faculty who teach in law clinics, know most if not all of this lesson already.  
This Essay is one example of the many ways in which the rest of their 
colleagues can catch up. 
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